interstate commerce – which clearly facilitates monitoring those movements and which has a minimal practical impact on intrastate sex offenders (who cannot be punished under federal law for failure to register unless and until they travel in interstate commerce) – is „reasonably adapted‟ to the goal of ensuring that sex offenders register and update previous registrations when moving among jurisdictions. Id. at 261 (footnote omitted). Relying on M’Culloch and Justice Scalia‟s concurrence in Raich, the Eighth Circuit observed that [a] narrow discussion which only analyzes § 16913 under the three categories of Lopez casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 16913. . . . However, an analysis of § 16913 under the broad authority granted to Congress through both the commerce clause and the enabling necessary and proper clause reveals the statute is constitutionally authorized. Howell, 552 F.3d at 715, quoted in United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the constitutionality of § 16913). The court in Howell determined that “SORNA was intended to regulate the interstate movement of sex offenders” and that § 16913 was “a reasonable means to track those offenders if they move across state lines.” Id. at 717; see also Vasquez, 611 F.3d at 331; United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Section 16913 is reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce clause. The requirement that sex offenders register under § 16913 is necessary to track those offenders who move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”). Pendleton cites, and we have found, no court of appeals that supports his argument that § 16913 is unconstitutional. The reasoning in the cases we have discussed above is congruous with our decision in Shenandoah, and we join our