each change of . . . residence . . . and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). SORNA‟s three-day time period prescribed the time by which Pendleton was required to register in Delaware, not how long he was required to stay without interruption in Delaware before it became the place where he “habitually live[d].” See Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 157.  We will affirm the District Court‟s conclusion that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. B. Due Process and Fair Notice There is no dispute that at the time Pendleton was arrested, he was not required to register as a sex offender under Delaware law. SORNA imposes a federal requirement that “[a] sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides,” which in this case was Delaware. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (emphasis added). Pendleton argues that as applied to him, SORNA violates the Due Process Clause because he did not have fair notice that federal law required him to register in Delaware, even though Delaware law did not.   “The Supreme Court has explained that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it „fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.‟” Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Attorney General, 580 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Pendleton contends that SORNA fails the “fair notice” element of this test in his case because it “directs an individual to register in the sex offender registry of a jurisdiction which does not require that he register as a sex offender.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 32.)  He argues that a person of ordinary intelligence would not know that federal law required him to do so when Delaware law did not.   Federal law, however, often